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ln a world where markets become internationally more integrated the social question will be an
important issue. Now this question is at stake in the European Community for "1992". The
integration of capital and labour markets may intensify capital and labour flows within the EC.
The size of these fluws is partly determined by the level of social insurance. Because migration
influences the financing and expenditure part of the social insurance system, policymakers have to
take into account migration behaviour in decision making on social insurance. In recent years a lot
of research has been done on the consequences of goods and capital flows on indirect and capital
tax rates. Often one concludes that tax competition between the member states, which pushes the
tax rates down. is likely W uccur. It is important tu analyse if this is also likely to happen with the
level of social insurance. Another and related issue is whether centralisation of decision-making
processes can be agreed upon to improve the welfare of all countries concerned. Is there a need
for a European federal transfer structure or could downwazd pressures on the system be corrected
by coordinating the decisions between the countries?
We focus the attention on the consequences fur labour mobility to the level of social insurance
systems from a public choice approach. Unlike most earlier models of social welfare, see for
example Pauly ( 1973) and Brown and Oates ( 1987), both workers and beneficiaries are assumed
to have political intluence in determining the level of social insurance.' A second deviation from
thtse models is that we do not base migratiun only on differences in sucial insurance systems.
According to the migration literature, migration decisions are mainly determined by guod labour
opportunities and wage level in the migration country, unemployment rate in the home country
and the amuun[ of intircmation about the migratiun country.
Therefore we consider two countries with a different level of social insurance and a different wage
rate. Both the level of social insurance and the wage rate are affected by the size of the migration
flow. These effects depend on the characteristics of the migrants. We diseriminate between people
who have good opportunites on the labour market and people who have less opportunities (further
on we lahel these groups as low-risk and high-risk, respectively, where risks refer to the
opportunities on the latwur market). In case high-risks are mobile our results corresponds closely
'Actually, in the mudel of Brown and Oates the median voter is decisive in determining the
size of the social welfare system. However, as the beneficiaries are assumed to be in the minority,
they have no effective say in the decision-making process.
z
to the results in literature, but in case low-risks are mobile our results deviate from the existing
resul[s. Migration of low-risk workers ha.c a positive effect on the tex rate in our model, if the
negative effects of an increase of low-risk workers on the wage rate outweigh the positive effects
of that increase on the social insurance system. So, if the mobility of the low-risk group is much
larger than the mobility of the high-risk group, the results of our model suggest that European
econumic integration does not necessarily cause a deterioration of the social insurance level. In
that case, coordination of decision making could even lower the average benefit level, contrary to
the case when the high-risk group is mobile.
In this paper decision making on social insurance is mudeled analogous to Verbon (1990). In the
second section we introduce this model and extend it fur migration uf luw-risk and high-risk
workers. In the tiillowing two sections we examine the tax rates, which result from the decision-
making process, in a partial and general equilibrium analysis, respectively. We compare the tax
and benefit rates with the situation in which migration was not possible. To cover the process of
increasing integration the effects of an exogenous change in mobility costs ere examined in section
five. The effects of cuordinated decision making between the countries including the pussibility of
a grant structure are considered in section six. We end the paper by comparing the results and
discussing briefly sume possible extensiuns of the model.
2. A model of dcYision making on social insurance and migration behaviuur
We develop a two-country model to study the consequences of migratiun on political decision
making with regard to social insurance. Social insurance systems have two important
characteristics. Firstly, they insure people against the risk of losing their labour income, for
example because of illness, disability or dismissal.2 Secondly, the systems are redistributive,
because peuple do not face the same risk, but they pay the same tax rate and get the same benefit
rate. So money is redistributed from people who have low risks to peuple who have high risks.
Both characteristics are captured in our model by assuming two groups, which have different risks
of heing unemployed, but are equal in all other aspects. These risks are essumed to be exogenous
and equal to a~ and 7i2 with ,~tc xi. Every worker receives a wage rate, w, and pays a
contribution, tr,,, to the social insurance system, while every wurker uut of the production
`So, if we use expressions like "the risk of being unemployed" in this paper, we do not only
imply unemployment, but also illness and disability.
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process receives a benefit, ~w. Both groups have a say in the decision on the level of the tax
rate, t, and the benefit rate, ~.
Migration flows change the workers-beneficiaries ratio in the country from which paople migrate,
the home country, and in the country to which they migrate, the migration country. litese changes
will affect the decisions made on the financing and expenditure part ut' the social insurance
system. Assuming that A is the migration country, the closed budget constraint of the system is
eyual to
~~lt(Ni {Mt){l2(NZ tM~] 1)"w" - [(1-xt)(Ni'Mt)'(1-12)(Nz'M~~ c"x," (1)
where Nr represents the initial size of group i(i-1,2) in country 1. M. the size of the net
migratiun flow of gruup i from country B to A, which is assumed [u be endogenous, and W r[he
wage rate in country 1. We assume that a worker faces in buth countries the same risk of being
jobless. Given the definition of M~ the budget constraint of country B has the same structure,
except for the negative signs before ~y~.
Because high-risk and low-risk wockers face a different risk, they desire a different level of social
insurance to cover their risk of being jobless. Both groups of workers form an interest group to
pursue their wishes in the political decision making process. The interest groups have political
intluence by voting and by lobbying. So the relative pulitical strength uf a group depends on
facturs like the size uf the group and lobbying cost.t. Decisions with regard tu the insurance
system are made according to the following function, which will he leheled as the pulitical
decision-making 1'unction'
~r -~rE(Ui) '(1-fhE(Uz) for I- A, B (2)
where E~ represents the relative political weight of group 1 in the decision making prucess of
cuuntry 1, which is assumed to be exogenous. E(U!), the expected utility of a member of group i
in country 1, is defined by
'See Coughlin ~t aL (1990) for a behavioural underpinning of the political decision- making
functiun.
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E(U,~) -(]-l~)U((1-t~wr) t x~U(rlrw~ for i- 1, 2 and 1- A, B (3)
where U( ) represents the utility of net wage and benetit level respectively. It is assumed that the
indirect utility function is two times continuously differentiable, marginal utility is strictly
decreasing, and the Inada conditions aze fulfilled. Using equation (I) and (3) we can rewriteDr
as follows'
D - d~U((1-t)w) t bzU(yiw) with






The reverse of thc workers-beneficiaries ratio, !, can be interpreted as the price of the social
r
insurance system. If insurance only would be possible within the own risk group, each group
wvuld chuose for full insurance, i.e. net lalwur income equal to henetit payment. However, hy
pvuling both risk groups into one comprehensive social insurance system, the system is no longer
actuarially fair. Obviously, as high-risk workers gain from pooling, they prefer a mvre than
complete coverage of their risk, while the reverse is true for low-risk workers. Whether less or
more than full insurance will actually be chosen depends on the political weights of the groups and
the price, !, vf the social insurance system. In case both groups have influence, it is clear that
r
~o't ~p and d~v~ ~p, if these derivatives are evaluated at the tax rate that is politically chosen.
a` a[
Individuals from both risk groups are assumed to have the opportunity to move to another
country. Corresponding to the 'human capital' approach of migration,' pcc~ple migrate if their
expected welfare in the migration country outweigh their expected welfare in the home country
plus migration costs. These costs which consist vf physical and psychulogical costs do even exist
if all barriers to labour mobility are removed in the process of economic integration. So people
move from country B to A if
"Because we do not want to mess up the equations with tvo many supscripts, we neglect I
when it is not confusing. If there is no superscript [, the equation refers to country A. The
eyuations for cuuntry B are dropped, because they are nearly similaz to those of country A.
SSee for a survey on determinants of migration, Greenwood (1975).
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E(U~)~ E(U~g t C~ i- 1,2 (6)
where C~ represents the migration costs for a member of group i.b For simplicity we only
consider the migration Flow from country B to A. The higher expectui utility in country A is a
conseyuence of an other population structure andlor political constellation andlor the labour
productivity, compared with country B.
Migration is in equilibrium if no one has an incentive to migrate anymore. This is the case if the
difference between the expected utilities is equal to the migration costs or if all members of a
group have migrated to one country. In the model these possibilities can be discriminated from
each other by the validity of the stability condition of migration, see Stiglitz (1977). [f the stability
condition holds, there is an internal equilibrium of the labour force in hoth countries. So
" í3E(U~") aE(U~~
E(U~ )- E(U~g . C~ if - c 0 i-1,2 (7)
i3M; dM~
If an internel eyuilibrium exists, then it follows that, apert from differences in the wage rate, the
migration tlow is determined by differences in the social insurance system that outweigh migration
costs, ,y. - M~(t",s",Ca i-1,2. If the migration equilibrium is distorted by a change in the
social insurance system, migration will occur, until a new equilihrium situation is reached, which
is guarantced hy the validity of the stability condition. The relatiun hctwecn changes in the tax
rate and changes in the size of the migration tlow can be obtained by differentiating the migration
equilibrium condition, equation (7).
aM~ aE(U,')~ds'
forlxJ, l,J-A,B ond i-1,2 (g)
di~ - aE(U~')~aM~ - c7E(UI)IaM~
The denominetor of this expression is equal to (minus) the stability condition. Because ~U'h cp
d~ t~pl, it follows that ~ cp (~'~pl in ca.ce the migration eyuilibrium is stable. The results
~- J l " I
or the home country are the opposite. Secondly, as a consequence uf our micro-economic based
migration function, ~' depends on t", tB and ,y.. This relationship is more general than in
Brown and Oates (1987), where it is assumed that the elasticity of the size of the migration Flow
to the benetit rate i~ cunstant.
bFor simplicity we assume that ~' - 0, instead of positive. IF the latter assumption is
reasonahle, our results will even hold waiAtSi less stringent assumptions on the congestion effects.
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The a-ssumption is used throughout that policymakers know that the luvel of social insurance is a
determinant uf migration decisions and will take this into account in their decisions on social
insurance. Because policymakers know migration behaviour, they will decide on a level of social
insurance that is uptimal taking into acwunt the migration tluw that result frum their decision. So,
at first, policymakers set a level of social insurance, and afterwards, workers take the migration
decision. This relation between migration and decision making on social insurance is analogous to
Pauly (1973) and Starrett (1980), who also captured the influence of migration to decision
making. It is important to note that, because the social insurance system is not actuarially fair,
migration beheviour intluences the price of the system. For that reason, it is not a good strategy
for policymakers to be myopic on migration behaviour in their decision making, as Boadway
(1982) argues in a slightly different context.
On Ihe other hand, it is assumed that policymakers take the tax rate in the other country as given.
As a consequence member states do not cooperate or even coordinate their decisions. This
framework provides us with the means to study tax competition as in Mintz and Tulkens (1986).
Therefore policymakers of both aiuntries maximise the political welfare of their country by taking
the level of social insurance in the other country as given.
Policymakers will not only take the effects of migration behaviour on the social insurance system
into account, but also the effects on the real wage rate. Therefore we consider a production
function, F(N~ with `~~~0, ~~N~~cO, ~~~~0 and
dH, dtly,J~ d(!yJ)
N-(1-lc)(Nc tMc) ~( 1-A2)(NztMz).' The only production factor is labour to highlight the
impact uf labour mobility between the countries. Because the wage rate is determined by marginal
labour productivity, an increase in the labour force by migration lowers the wage rate in country
A, ~~ -~N~ ~~ -(1-,~a~~~ c 0 and raises it in B. Given these assumptions we derive,
aM, av, av, ~~l
for later purposes, the expected mazginal utility of group i with respect to the size of the
migration tluw.
dE(U~) ~ ~ ~~
aM -(1-x~(1-t)aM~U((1-r)w) t
ZctaM~w}tydM~
U(iyw) for i,l - 1,2 (9)
'Notice that both groups of workers are equally productive in spite of their different
probabilities of getting temporarily laid off. For country B, the size of the migration flow has to
be substracted from the initial size of the groups.
3. Decision making on social insurance: a partial equilibrium analysis
In this section we discuss the optimal tax rate if policymakers take into account the migrati
flow, given the level of social insurance in the other wuntry. The political decision-mak:
function, equation (4), is maximized taking into account the effect of a change in the system
migration behaviour. The first order condition is equal to'
~D - bc(-wt(1-t) ~)(I'((1-c)w) t b2(ywtt~wtry ~)U'(syw) - 0
The first part of this equation measures the negative effect of an increase in the tax rat
utility of the net wages, the marginal cost, while the second part measures the positive c
the utility of the benefit level, the marginal benefit. In the optimum the marginal cost eqi
marginal benefit. The marginal cost azises from two effects. One is the direct effect or
wage and the other one is the indirect effect on the wage rate, ~- ~~' or i-1a~ aM, a~ j
marginal benefit can be decomposed in three effects. First, the direct effect of the tax rate
the indirect effect on the price of the social insurance system through the induced migrati
~-~~' jor r-1,2, and the third effect is caused by the changing wage rate. For detc
a` - aN, a~
of the signs of these derivatives it essential to know if the stability condition is satis
simplify the analysis, we assume from now on that only one group is mobile at the sar
11ie mohility costs of the mobile group can be offset by the expected utility differential, v
mobility costs of the other group are assumeai to be too large to take migration into aca
course this assumption is analogous with the distinction between the mubility of the rich ~
in the fiscal federelism literature.
First we discuss migration of high-risks. From equation (5) and the assumptions ;
production function we derive that ?'c and ?"' both have a negative (positive) sigi
au, a~,
migration (hume) country. Because policymakers take the tax rate in the other country
~' follows from eyuation (8). From equation (9) it follows that migration unambiguous
a`
the expected utility of both risk-groups in country A and raises it in B. This implie~
stability condition holds and therefore ~ and ?" have a negative sign tbr both countries.
a~ a~
~Ye will assume that the second order condition for maximisation is tulfilled.
can nut prove this in general, this condition appears to hold in the numerical simulat
model.
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Given these results it follows that the tax rate in both countries will he lower, given the tax rate in
the other country, compared to the case when migration is not possihle. This can be seen by
evaluating equation (10) in the point where the tax rate is optimal if no migration would occur
(the wage rate and the price of the system are exogenous), ~ is negative. The reason is quite
clear. Because an intlow of high-risk workers implies a decrea.ee in utility for both groups, see
equation (9), both groups opt for a lower tax rate in order to prevent an increase in the size of the
high-risk group in their country. ln country B hoth groups desire a lower tax rate to stimulate
emigration. As a result the henefit rate in A is definitely lower, but there are opposite effects on
the benefit rate in country B: the decrease of the tax rate and of the number of allowances. It is
not known a priori which effect dominates. Note that in countries with rigid wage rates,
policymakers will set higher tax rates than in countries with flexible wage rates.
In case low-risk workers aze mobile, it is not guaranteed that the stahility condition is fulfilled.
The negative congestion effects of migration in country A(~c0) may he eompensated by the
decrease of the price of the system (?r ~0), see equation (9). Barring this unlikely case, we
aw,
assume that the congestion effects on the wage rate dominate these on the social insurance system
near the eyuilibrium, so ~u;t c0 ~d at~u,~ ~0 Given these assumptions it holds for both
aMt aM,
countries that ~ has a negative sign and ?Y has a positive sign.
a~ a~
These two opposite effects complicates the comparison with the tax rates in the nonmigration case.
T'he congcstion effects on the latxiur market will have an upward effect on the tax rate, hecause
policymakers wam to decrease the number of low-risks. On the other hand, as low-risk workers,
are net contrihutors to the system, there is a tendency to decrease the tax rate. If the first order
condition is evaluated in the point where migration is not possible, tax rates will be higher ín an
integrated market if the following equation is fulfilled.
b~(1-t)~ U'((1-t)w) t bztf~wty~ lU'(tyw) -~M aát~0
` f t
In other words, if ao"-{~u~t} (1-~)arxu~ has a negative sign, the tax rate in country A is
dM~ dM~ cLl~ "
higher if low-risk workers are mobile. As can be seen from equation (9), if a~u~tc0, it is
dM~
nevertheless possible that ~X3~ ~0, provided Ihat Ihe parameter ~2 is large enough compared
i
with ,~t. In that case the tax rate will be lower in country A if the relative political power of the
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high-risk group is large enough.' We will concentrate on the case that a~?' ~ p and ao' , p. The
aM, áw
tax rates of both countries will be higher aimpared to the nonmigration eyuilibrium, given the tax
rate in the other country. This implies that the benefit rate in the migration country will be raised,
due to the higher tax rate and lower price of the system, while the change in the benefit rate of
the home country is ambiguous, due to the opposite effects of a higher tax rate and a higher price
of the system.
Note that if wages are not influenced by the size of the migration flow, it follows from equation
(9) that d~~'y ~ p and ~~'S ~ p, so the stability condition will not hold. If the expected utility
aa, aH,
differential between country A and B outweighs migration costs, see eyuatiun (7), all low-risk
workers migrate to country A. As a consequence of the migration of low-risk workers, the
expeued utility of both groups increases in country A. This is due to the fact that low-risk
workers are net contributors to the social insurance system. By lowering tax rates policymakers in
Ihe migration and home country try to stimulate immigration and prevent emigration,
respectively.'o The country with the more favourable political andlor population conditions or
higher wage level will attract all low-risk workers. We conclude that, if congestion effects on the
labour market are not relevant, mobility of the low-risk group will lead to a gathering of this
group in one country only due to the economics of scale of emigration by this group."
4. Decisiun making on social insurance: a general eyuilibrium analysis
In the previous section the optimal tax rate was derived given the tax rate of the other country.
However, it is of interest to consider the relation among the tax rates in the two countries and to
examine the Nash-equilibrium that result from maximisation of the decision-making functions of
both countrics given the optimal tax rate of the other country. We will pursue this by deriving the
'Note, that we have the paradoxical result that if the political power of the high-risk group and
their probability of getting laid off aze relatively high, this will lead to a worsening of the social
insurance system as measured by the tax rate.
'bI'his result is well known in the literature on `brain drains'. Bhagwati and Hamada (1952)
derive from their model that less developed countries lower tax rates to prevent migration of the
higher educated.
"Nute that this conclusiun implies that if low-risks are mobile one has to assume cungestion
costs that outweigh the scale effects of migration to guarantee an internal equilibrium. If high-risks
are mobile, these scale effects do not exist, so the introduction of congestion effects on the labour
market are not necessary to guarantee an internal equilibrium.
la
reaction functions. From the first order condition it follows that the level of [he tax rate depends
on the size of the migration flow and the tax rate of the other country, so
ir- c(M~,r~ for i- 1,2 and IsJ. The differential form of this function can be found by
differentiating the first order condition, equation (10), with respect to both tax rates and the
migration flow. We find
d2D~dtf t~D` dM i~Dr dt' - 0 for l,J-A,B and !~J and i-1,2 (12)
a(t~2 at'aM, ' ~,~J
On the other hand the size of the migration flow depends on both tax rates. By differentiating the
migration equilibrium condition this relation can be written as
aE(Ui)d~ } f aE(Ui) aE(UZ~
3s" Il dM~ aM~
I ,.. - 8E(UZ~
~anT~ drB for i-1,2
I dre
(13)
If the conditions of the implicit function theorem aze fulfilled, the solutions of the tax rates can be
written as a function of the other tax rate. Information about these reaction functions can be
obtained by suhstituting equation (13) into (12).
d2D` dZD`dt` -- dt' I,J-A,B ~~J and i-1,2
d(s5Z drrds'
(14)
where the total derivatives consist of the partial derivatives from equation (l2) and (13). The
relation between the total and partial derivatives and their signs are discussed in the appendix.
Equation (14) gives the derivatives of the reaction functions, i.e. it describes how the tax rate of
one country reacts to a change in the tax rate of the other country. Notice that '-o has a negative
dr~
sign, because of the second order condition for welfare maximisation. Under some plausible
assumptions "'~' has a negative sign for both countries irrespective of the risk of being
Mdí
unemployed of the mobile group. This result is based on the assumptions that the utility function
is strongly curved, i.e. that the absolute value of the elasticity of the mxrginal utility of the net
wage and benetit are relatively lazge, and, secondly, that the social insurance system has such a
high coverage that the effects of the change in the price of the system dominates the effects of the
change in the wage rate. The economic implication of the first assumption is that the income effect
of changes on the benefit and wage level dominates the possibly opposed suhstitution effect. So, if
the tax rate in the home country is raised and as a consequence less people with a high risk of
II
being jobless migrate, policymakers in the migration country will lower the tax rate, hecause of
the dominance of the income effect. For further details we refer to the appendix.
From these results it follows that both total derivatives in equation (14) have a negative sign, so
the reaction curves have a negative slope in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium. From our
simulations it follows that the ahsolute value of the slope of the reaction curve of country A is
always Farger than the absolute value of the slope of the reaction curve of country B in the Nash-
equilibrium, independent of the risk of the migrants.'~ We know from the partial analysis in
section 3 that both countries set a lower tax rate if migration of high-risks is possible, given the
tax rate in the other country. As a result in the Nash-equilibrium tax rates will be lower compared
with the situation where migration of high-risk workers is not possible. This is illustrated in figure
{insert figure 1}
So in correspondence with results in literature, e.g. Brown and Oates (1987), the labour mobility
of high-risks will lead to a lower average level of the social insurance tax rate, because the federal
states want to diminish the size of high-risk workers. Because of the outflow of high-risk workers
in the home country, it is not necessarily true Ihat the benefit rate in that country is also lower.
However our simulation results, see table 1, suggests that the decrease in the tax rate is of more
importance for the benefit rate than the outflow of migrants.
In case the low-risk workers aze mobile, the results are the opposite. Following the same
reasoning as above we conclude that the level of both tax rates in the Nash-equilihrium is higher
than in the nonmigration case. The benefit rates in both countries are also higher, if in the home
country the effect of the change in the tax rate on the benefit rate dominates the effect of the
outflow of low-risk workers. This is the case in our simulations, see table I.
5. The effects of increasing integration
Since the European economic integration is an ongoing process, it is also important to analyse the
effects of removing barriers to labuur mobility. The measures of the European Community to ease
migration can be represented in the model by decreasing mobility costs. Such changes in uists can
'~Note that this implies that the equilibrium is numerically stable.
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be due to policy measures such as the abolition of border control in the Community or the
disappearance of the twrders alltogether in the FRG and the former GDR. On the other hand,
information campaigns about job possibilities in other countries and the organisation of exchange
programs, are examples of policy measures aimed at decreasing the psychological barriers to
migration.
The effects of a change in mobility costs can be found by a compazative-static analysis. Starting
from the Nash-equilibrium described by equation (14) the effects of a change in mobility costs
follows by totally differentiating both first order conditions and the migration equilibrium
condition. From the migration equilibtium it follows that the extra inflow of migrants into the
migration country is determined by the initial effect of the decrease in mobility costs and the
inflow that result from the changes in the tax rates.
8M. 8M í3E(U") i3E(U,") dC (15)dM, - -dr' t 'dre t -
8r" 8~ 8M, 3M,
If d~y, is substituted in de differentiated tirst order conditions, see equation (12), it follows that
d-D~di t d-D~d~ . a2~~
8E(U;") 8E(UB) dC - 0 I,J-A,B, I~J
d(r7- dr'd~ ar'aM. aM; - 8M,
(16)
From equation (16) we can solve Ihe changes in the tax rates as a function of the change in
mobility costs. If we define Sr as minus the slope of the reaction curve, see equation (14), this
relation is equal to
Sd - `d(s~l ~~aVl~1 - SB~TI d1D, ` - a2D'
eiD' a'D'
d1d1a1a~r, (aatu,g - aacu,til-~dC
for1,J-A.B.ItJ (17)d~p~ l aar, a,w, J
a~3'
If SA, SB", the lett hand side of this equation has a positive sign. Given the signs of the partial
and total derivatives, as is discussed in the appendix, the sign on the right hand side of equation
(17) is negative (positive) for mobility of the high-risk (low-risk) group in the migration country.
As a result, if high-risk workers aze mobile, the tax rate is raised in the migration country and it
'`I'his implies that the equilibrium is locally stable. [n the numerical simulations with the
model this condition always appeared to hold.
l3
is lowered in the home country. This is illustrated in figure 2. If low-risks are mobile, the signs of
the changes are reversed.
{insert figure 2}
Given the fact that ~ ~p and ~~p, we can conclude from equation (15) that lower mobility
costs increase the síze of the migration flow. Lower mobility costs stimulate migration. As
discussed in the appendix this has two effects on the benefit levels. On the one hand the marginal
benefit with respect to the tax rate is changed. This effect could be positive or negative, so the
effect on the level of the tax rate is ambiguous. On the other hand, the increase (decrease) of
high-risk workers in the migration (home) cuuntry raises (lowers) the marginal utility of the
benefit level. The second effect induces pulicymakers in the migration (home) country to raise
(lower) the tax rate. Because we have assumed that the second effect dominates, policymakers in
the migration country will raise the tax rate, while policymakers in the home country will lower
it. An analogous reasoning can be held, if low-risks migrate. This implies that in case the social
insurance system in the migration country is better than in the home country, the systems will
diverge from each uther.
On the other hand it is possible that the migration effect on the marginal utility of the benefit
dominates the effect on the marginal benefit. In that case the signs of the partial second order
derivatives to the tax rate and the size of the migration flow are reversed. According tu our
numerical results, d'~' is positive for both countries, so the term on the right hand side of
drdl
eyuation ( 17) has an ambiguous sign. Tax rates could be raised or lowered, even the change in the
size of the migration flow is not determined. This is illustrated in figure 3, where is assumed that
high-risk workers are mobile.
{insert figure 3}
The results we obtained by lowering mobility costs deviate from Gramlich (1985). This is caused
by the fact that Gramlich represents increasing mobility by raising his exogenous elasticity of the
tax rate to the migration flow. So migration behaviour is more sensitive to changes in the tax rate.
Such a change in the elasticity is compazable to the situation that migration becomes possible,
when this was initially not the case. As a consequence policymakers in the migration country will
lower the tax rate. In our case lower mobility costs imply that people get the incentive tu migrate
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because uf the differences in expected utility, but does not necessarily imply that people are more
sensitive to changes in the taz rate.
6. Coordination of decision making
Policymakers maximise the decision-making function in their country, while taking the decisions
in the other country as given. As is well known, such behaviour is inefficient, because both
countries neglect the benefits and costs of their own decisions accruing to the other country, e.g.
if the migration country lowers (raises) the tax rate to prevent migration of high-risk (low-risk)
workers, the home country faces the costs of less migration. Such externalities can be taken into
account if policymakers of both countries coordinate their decisions. In this section we examine
the desirability of coordination and the effects for the level of social insurance. We use the term
'cuordination' to characterise the situation that countries decide autonomously on the level of
social insurance in taking into account the external effects to the other country. Coordination will
only be agreed upon if buth wuntries gain from it. If we write the political decision-making
function in the Nash-equilibrium as DI - Dr(4r,M~(tr,i~)) jor IxJ and I,Je(A,B),i-1,2,
coordination will be strictly 'welfare'-improving if
dD' - a0,dcr . aDr aMJdtf t aM'dr'I ~ 0 forlsJ and I,JE{A.BI, i-1,2 (18)
atr aM~ ~r ~f
If this expression is evaluated in the Nash-equilibrium, the first and second term on the right hand
side of equation (10) cancel out for both countries. As ~" ~~ and do' dM~ are buth positive in
aur, ~~ au, ar'
case high-risk workers are mobile, both countries want to coordinate their actions only if the other
tax rate is raised compared with the Nash-equilibrium. In case low-risks are mobile both
expressions have a negative sign and policymakers only want to coordinate if the tax rate in the
other country is luwered. Let us suppose that the countries agree to coordinate their actions by
acting `as if they maximise the following welfaze function
Dr~ - D" t D" for 7-A,B (19)
The first order cundition for policymakers in country I becomes now
]5
dDc` c7Dr } c3Df aMc } ap~ BM~ - B for
laJ and I,J E IA.BI, i-1,2 (20)
drr - drf aMc r7rr dMc ~r
If we evaluate this expression in the Nash-equilibrium, we find that `~` ~0 for I-A,B if high-r
risks migrate and ~` c0 for l-A,B if low-risks migrate. So indeed, in both countries
a.
policymakers want to coordinate their decisions according to equation (19). By this coordination
arrangement the costs of migration aze internalized.
In the case that high-risk workers aze mobile, policymakers in country A raise the tax rate in
order to lower the size of high-risk workers in country B. In the same way policymakers in
country B raise the tax rate, because migration is costly for the migration country. Both tax rates
and the average benefit rate wil be higher compazed to the Nash-equilibrium when countries
coordinate their actions. Remarkably, one tax rate is even higher than the corresponding
nonmigration taz rate. If the term ~~" .~'l~~ is positive, the tax rate in country A will be
higher, because the (positive) migration~ effects fon ttte social insurance system in the home country
are larger than the (negative) effects in the migration country. If these effects aze smaller (so the
term in brackets is negative), the tax rate of country B is higher than the nonmigration tax rate.
We cunclude thet coordination of decision making on social insurance prevents a worsening of the
system compared with the Nash-equilibrium and could possibly sustain a level of social insurance
that is comparable with the nonmigration level, if high-risk workers are mobile. In our simulation
results, see table 1, this conjecture appeazs to hold. Note that we have established that there will
be tax competition in a decentralized system of social insurance if the high-risks are mobile. This
amfirms the results of Gramlich (1985), Gramlich-Laren (1984) en Brown and Oates (1987)
Although policymakers have the same motives if low-risks are mobile, the results are the opposite.
Policymakers in both countries lower the tax rate to diminish the costs accruing to the other
country. If the negative welfare effects of migration in country A dominate the positive welfare
effects of migration in country B, (~" .~'lcp the tax rate in country A is still higher than
`~~ dy~ J
before economic integration, but the tax rate in B is lower.
For policy matters it is essential to know the degree of mobility of hoth groups. Accurding to
Greenwood (1975) and Heijke (1987), higher educated are far more mobile than lower educated.
This statement is based on arguments like the amount of information that higher educated have
about labour opportunities abroad, and the quality of these labour opportunities. If we roughly
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identify higher educated with low-risk workers, migration of low-risk workers is more likely than
migration of high-risk workers. So in the European Community, coordination of social insurance
systems does not necessarily protect the expenditures on social insurance, but could deteriorate
them if wuntries do not want to attract low-risk workers." On the other hand, if this last
assumption is not valid, coordination would protea the level of social insurance.
Until now coordination only means that policymakers take into account the welfaze effects of their
dec:isions on the other country. The cooperation of the countries could be extended by introducing
transfer payments between the countries into to direct the migration flow. Although in equilibrium
people have no incentive to migrate, the allocation of the population between the countries is in
general not efficient, even when there aze not any migration costs. It may be Pazeto improving if
one country transfers a grant to the other country, to prevent or stimulate migration." lf the
migration country pays a grant to the uther country, potential migrants have fewer incentives to
migrate because the welfare differential has been diminished. If the increase in welfare of country
A, caused by less expenditures on social insurance, is not dominated by the costs of the grant and
if the increase of welfare in country B, caused by the transfer payment, is not dominated by the
extra expenditures on allowances, the grant is Pareto improving.
In our social insurance model the introduction of a grant implies that one country partly finances
the social insurance system of the other country, so the system is only closed for the countries
together, but not for both countries apart. The grant appears on the expenditure side in the budget
constraint of the donor country and on the financing side in the constraint of the receiving
country. As a consequence the grant has a direct effect on utility of both groups in the two
countries, which implies a change in [he preferred tax rates. Moreover, the grant and the
concomitant tax change induce a migration flow, so M~ - M~(z",sB,S). 1f we write the political
decision making function as Dr - Dr(c1,S,M~(tr,~~,S)) for I~J and I,Je(A,B~, i-1,2, then the
grant is strictly Pareto improving if
'"Of course, coordination is efficient, but that is not the issue here.
'SSee for a more detailed discussion on the efficiency of grants Boadway and Flatters (1982).
~ r ~( aM aM aM 1
dD1- aD dsrt aDdSt aDl-'dirt-'dr'f ~dSJ~O jor IsJ nnd I,JE{A,Bj (21)aii aS aM~ ~i 3~ aS
Because we are interested in the question if the introduction of a grant in an economic community
is welfare improving for both countries compared with coordination, we evaluate equation (21) in
the point where the tax rates are optimal according to equation (20). So
~! - [ ~r i aMr aM,1~ } aM,
aM~ds~ - ~ aM~dr! for !sJ and I,JE{A,BE (22)
~ ~a,' ~atr
If we assume that the grant is transferted from country A to B, aD" has a negative sign and ~~
as az
a positive sign. Because the grant raises welfare in the home country, the migration flow
diminishes, so the sign of ~~ for i-1 2 is negative. So the expression preceeding ~ can be
positive or negative. We assume that for one country the expression preceeding ~ is positive and
for the other country it is negative. The expressions preceeding dte and dt~ have a positive sign,
if high-risks are mobile and a negative sign if low-risks migrate.
If we wmbine both inequalities of equation (22), a grant is strictly welfare improving if the
changes of both tax rates and the size of the grant fulfil the following condition
aD" t aD" aM~ ~ i aD"
aM~dta - aDx aM~dc" ~ a~x , a~"
aM~
dS (23)
aS aM~ dS, aM~ aT" aM~ aza [ aS aM~ dS,
So, if the coefticient preceeding ~ is positive for country A, policymakers in country A raise the
tax rate to finance the grant, while policymakers in country B lower the tax rate. In that case the
negative direct welfare effects of the grant on country A are dominated by the positive welfare
effects of the decreasing size of the migration flow, while in country B the welfare gains of the
grant dominate the welfare costs of an increased labour supply. Because we have assumed that for
high- and low-risk workers congestion costs on the labour mazket dominate these costs on the
social insurance system, this result is valid for the mobility of both groups.
In the analysis above both countries decide on their own contributions and outlays on the social
insurance system. Countries could also decide to integrate their social insurance systems
completely, so that contributions and benefit levels are equal in both countries. In that case people
have no incentive to migrate in this model if the wages in both countries are equal. The problem
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is Ihat the individual atuntries differ from each other in the population structure andlor political
constellation. In that case the tax rates of country A and B that tit equation (20) in a decentralized
system where decisions are coordinated are not the same. The optimal tax rate in a centralized
system can not fulfil this equation, which implies that a global social insurance system is not
efficient, compared to coordinated decision making in a decentralized system.
7. Conclusions
We studied different aspects of the influence of migration on decision making on social insurance
systems. Cleazly, if labour mobility increases due to economic integration this will affect decision
making. The results depend on the mobility of the groups and the congestion effects on the
economy, especially the labour market. The effects of migration of high-risk workers eorrespond
with the results in literature. Migration has a downwazd pressure on the average level of social
insurance benefits, although it is not clear in our model whether the henefit level in the migration
country is also lower. ln examining mobility of the low-risk group the existence ol congestion
effects on the labour market appeared to be of crucial importance. If the countries only differ in
social insurance systems all low-risk workers migrate to the country with lower tax rates, because
they prefer lower rates. As countries want to attract low-risk workers, they compete against each
other by lowering tax rates. If countries consider migration as a cost, they raise tax rates to try to
reduce the size of the low-risk group. In this case the possibility of migration could even result in
a higher level of social insurance in both countries. Because it is expected that low-risk workers
are much more mubile than high-risk workers in Europe and there exists congestion costs in most
countries, the European integration will probably not worsen the level of social insurance,
according to our model.
Coordination of decision making on social insurance could (partially) offset the consequences of
migration on the level of social insurance. If cauntries take the welfare effects on the other into
accoun[ one country will set a higher tax rate than in the nonmigration case and the other country
a lower tax rate. The benetit levels may change even less. If countries face congestion effects on
the economy and low-risk workers are mobile coordination could even lower the tax rates. A
federal grant structure between the countries could be in the interest of all countries because it
influences migration tlows and a more favourable population structure in both countries is
possible. A disadvantage of the grant structure is that the precise size of the grant and the
necessary corresponding tax changes can be hard to be established. The advantage of both
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coordination measures is that countries hold their autonomous decision power on social insurance
and that all countries profit from cooperation.
The importance of modeling economic congestion effects raises some questions about the
economic swcture of the model. Contrary to the facts, capital is immobile in the model. This has
consequences for the sensitivity for the wage level to migration flows. If for example capital flows
have the same direction as migration flows, the downwazd pressure on wage levels could be
(partly) offset by the increase of capital. Even more important is the fact that the flow of capital
can be influenced hy labour costs and therefore the level of social insurance. The mobility of
capital cuuld imply a downwazd pressure on the Ievel of social insurance. These issues will he
taken up in further research.
Appendix
In this appendix we give the relation between the second order total derivatives of the political
welfare function and the partial derivatives and we discuss their signs. Given these signs we can
determinate the slope of the reaction curves, equation (14) and the effects of a change in the
mobility wsts. The second order condition of maximisation for the political welfare function,
equation (4), is equal to
d ZD - azD y azD aMr ~ 0
dsZ ds~ c3sdM~ at
It appeared in uur simulations that this condition was always fultilled.
Tha other total derivative of equation ( 14) is equal to
d~D r- azD r aM~ } a~D r
d,'d~ a~aM a,~ a~ar' (A2)
We need to know the signs of the partial derivatives in order to say something about the sign of
the total derivative. The expression ~D can be written as
~~,
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a-D - a1 a2L U,(L) , á aL aL U..(L) , b2 a~8 U ,(B) , aB aB U..(B) (A3)
araM, araM~ ar aM~ araM; ar aM~
where L represents the net wage level and B the benefit level. From the first order condition we
know that ~ ~ 0, ~ ~ 0 in the home country and ~ ~ 0. Equation (A3) consists of four terms.
The first (third) measures the effect of an increase of the migration flow on the marginal net wage
(benefit) to the tax rate. These effects, which can be interpreted as price effects, consists of
substitution and income effec;ts. The price effects can be positive or negative. If they are negative,
policymakers have an incentive to lower the tax rate. The second (fourth) term measures the
negative (positive) effect of an increase in the migration flow on the marginal utility of the net
wage (benefit). These can be interpreted as income effects. Because of the negative effect of an
increase in the size of high-risk workers in the migration country on the mazginal utility of the net
wage policymakers want to lower the tax rate, but because of the positive effect on the marginal
utility of the benefit they want to raise it. To make some plausible assumption about the sign of
equation (A3), we define the elasticity of the mazginal utility, o~ -~o'~t ( ~ 0). A larger absolute
u'(,)
value of the elasticity of marginal utility implies that the income effects become more important
relative to the suhstitution effects. Equation (A3) becomes now
a-D - a aL aL U'(L)
~E 3 a~ t ó, aB aB U' (B) ~E ta~
araM~ ' ar aM, L `` ar aM~ B B"
(A4)
with E-~~ t~'~ a~ . With the help of the first order condition eyuation (A4) can be rewritten
~ d.JM~ d, dM
as
a~aM~ - S' ar U(L) (L , aM~ ~E` } ai)
- B-' áM' ~ee { a"~1
(AS)
The term in hrackets has no clear cut sign. Therefore we make a simplifying a.esumption. We
assume that the coverage of the risk in the system is on a level such that changes in the price of
the system, caused hy migration, have more impact than changes on the wage rate, which is in
general the case if the coverage is high enough. Note that d~ -( t-r)~ and ~ -~.~. r~w.
dM. dM dM, dM~ dM~
In case of full insurance it holds that 1-r-r.y and E ~.pt is approximately equal to Eg tQe, so
that the term in brackets reduces to -B-tt~,N,(EBto~. If Ee.QB~O, for example hecause the
income effect is dominant, the sign of equation (AS) is positive (negative) if the high-risks (low-
risks) are mobile for the migration country. The results for the home country are the opposite.
zt
The other partial second order derivative in equation (12) reads
drrdtr -
(bt(1-s~~rU~((1-s~wh . b~~rr~rwl . Try1~llU~(t1ylw,l
r~M, (A6)
aM1 aM, dM~ J J at ds'
where
dra~u,`t a~qu;)
r~M1 - ~~ ~~~





--(1-L~ ~U'((1-s)w)(lto~ ~ 7t1(Mw t Y~lU'(tYw)(1taJ (A8)
1 1 l i ~J
The sign of equation (A8) depends also on the a.csumptions about the curvature of the utility
function and the coverage of the social insurance system. We assume that the absolute value of the
elasticity of marginal utility of the net wage (a~) and the benefit level (QF) are larger than one
and that the coverage is such that the effect of the change ïn the price of the syslem duminate.e that
of the change in the wage rate. The simulation results support these assumptions. So it follows
that ~~u~ is positive (negative) for the migration country if high-risks (low-risks) are mobile.
au,a~
The results for the home country are the opposite. From equation (A7) it follows that the sign of
~M' is positive (negative) for the migration (home) country. Because we have assumed that
a.'a.'
congestion effects on the latwur market dominate these on the social insurance system, see
equation (11), the sign of (A8) is negative in both cases for both countries.
With these results it is possible to determine the sign of a'~' . From equation (A2) it follows that
d~N
for both the migration and home country the sign of this total derivative is negative, independent
of the group that migrates, given that, firstly, the curvature of the utility function is strong enough
and, secondly, there is enough coverage of the risk so that changes in the price of the system
dominates change,e in the wage rate.
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In the simul;itions we specifieJ for the utility anJ ~~olitical we;ltare function a CES function
with coefficient I-a. a is set :~t 1.~. The procluction function is specifieel as a Cohb Douglas
function with decreasing returns tu sc:~le, the coefficient is set at 0.7i. The scale cuefficients
of the production function are: A'- L0~ and A" - L00. The risks of being johless of [he
low ;tnd high-risk workers are se[ at x~ - 0.15 and x~ - 0.30. We assume that the ini[ial
population cnnsists of 5 million low-risk workers anel i million high-risks workers in both
countries. The political influence of [he low-risks is set at ï;' - O.SO and ï;" - 0.60. The
political weight of the low-risk workers in the home country is higher, so that high-risk
people have an incentive to migrate to country A. For the same reason f" is set at 0.4 if
low-risk workers are mobile. q represents the weighted average benefit rate for btxh
countries.
In both tables we analyse three cases: firstly, a comliarision of the situatiuns tha[ migration is
not possihle and pulicymakers t:~ke into account migration behaviour (C - LU5), secondly,
declining mohility costs (C - I.OS and C- 1.04) anil, thirdly, a com~arison of the si[uations
with anJ without coordination.
Table lA: Hi h-risk workers mi rate
CASE r' ola ~ olo ' c!c t)" Co it cló M I(Y
No mi~ration 22.5 2L5 77.~ 74.0 75.8 0.0
C- 1.05 19.1 I5.5 64.2 54.9 59.9 5.42
C- 1.04 19.3 15.1 G4.G ~~3.1 599 7.85
Coordination
C- 1.05
22.5 2L~ 77.4 74.2 75.8 0.72
CuorJination
C- 1.04
22.7 21.3 77.3 7~3.2 75.2i 2.25
Table 16: lw[w-risk workers miqrate
CASE T' oro ~ oro) q' 4'n) t)" S'n q or~ M 10'
No mi ~ration 22.5 25.5 77.5 )i LO 79.2 0.0
C- LOS 25.i{ 27.9 90.2 94.7 92.4 3.20
C- 1.04 25.6 28. I 90.5 94.2 92.3 6.17
Coordination
C- 1.05
22.5 23.5 77.8 80.6 79.2 I.10
Coordin;ttion
C- L04
22.4 23.7 78.2 R0.2 79.2 3.72
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